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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. The Failure to Consider and Rule on Allegations o.lSufficient Reason 
Precludes Dismissal Upon Grounds of Waiver 
Mr. Kuehl has argued that the District Court erred in summarily dismissing his successive 
petition for post-conviction relief without considering and ruling on whether Mr. Kuehl had 
presented sufficient reason for the failure to assert the claims in the first petition. Appellant's 
Opening Brief at pages 9-14. The State has offered two arguments in response: 1) that Mr. 
Kuehl's reasons for failing to present the successive claims were not verified or sworn, and 2) 
that the advice of Mr. Kuehl's original post-conviction counsel does not establish sufficient 
reason for Mr. Kuehl's failure to present the successive claims earlier. Respondent's Brief at 
pages 11-17. As will be discussed below, both arguments fall short. 
1. Verification Is Not Required For A Response To A Notice of 
Intent To Dismiss 
The State argues that "in order for [Mr.] Kuehl to avoid summary dismissal of his 
successive claims and be entitled to an evidentiary hearing, he had the burden of establishing 
through 'affidavits, records, or other evidence,' LC. 19-4903, 'sufficient reason,' LC.§ 19-4908, 
why he failed to present his claims previously." Respondent's Brief p. 15. The State appears to 
argue that because Mr. Kuehl set out his reasons in his response to the District Court's notice of 
intent to dismiss, which was an unverified pleading, that summary dismissal was appropriate. 
Respondent's Brief at pages 12-15. 
The State's argument, however, relies on a false premise - that the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure do not apply to post-conviction proceedings. See, Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 57, 
106 P.3d 376,383 (2004) (post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure); Cole v. State, I Idaho 107, 110, 15 P.3d 820,823 (2000) (same). 
Idaho Code 19-4902(a) requires that the initial application for post-conviction relief be 
verified and that facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant and the authenticity of all 
documents and exhibits included in or attached to the application must be sworn to affirmatively 
as true and correct. There is no requirement that pleadings other than the initial application be 
verified. 
Because the Civil Rules apply to post-conviction and because the post-conviction statute 
does not require verification of pleadings other than the initial application for post-conviction 
relief, I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(l) applies. That rule states in pertinent part: 
... Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need 
not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an attorney or party 
constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has read the pleading, motion or 
other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief 
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact ... 
Mr. Kuehl signed the pleading the State now complains of. R. Vol. I, page 131. Pursuant 
to Rule 11 ( a)(l ), that signature is sufficient; further verification is not required. 
The State's citation to King v. State, 114 Idaho 442, 757 P.2d 705 (Ct. App. 1988), does 
not change this conclusion. In King, the Court of Appeals affirmed the summary dismissal of a 
petition for post-conviction relief on two bases: 
There were no affidavits, records or other evidence offered either with King's 
second application or with his "Traverse", other than an affidavit by King 
outlining the factual circumstances of the commission of the rape and expressing 
dissatisfaction because of lesser penalties meted out to co-defendant on the rape 
charge. The conclusory allegations offered by King were not substantiated as 
required by the statute. As to this ground for dismissal, the district court was 
correct. 
114 Idaho at 446, 757 P.2d at 709 (emphasis added). 
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This first basis for the summary dismissal has nothing to do with the question of whether 
King presented sufficient reason for the failure to assert or adequately raise an argument in the 
first petition so as to allow the filing of a successive petition as required by I.C. § 19-4908. 
Rather, the Court of Appeals simply held that if the allegations in the petition, not the response to 
a notice of intent to dismiss, are not supported by affidavits, records or other evidence other than 
conclusory allegations, summary dismissal is allowed. 
With regard to the question of whether Mr. King had demonstrated sufficient reason for 
his failure to raise his claims in his original petition, the Court of Appeals did not affirm the 
summary dismissal on the basis that the reasons offered had not been verified or supported by 
sufficient evidence. Rather, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court insofar as the 
District Court found that Mr. King had offered no reasons at all, verified or unverified, to explain 
why he did not raise all his claims in his original petition . 
. . . On January 20, 1987, the district court ordered the second application 
dismissed, finding that King had 'every opportunity to raise all grounds ofrelief in 
his original application;' and 'there is no new evidence coming to light and 
petitioner does not give sufficient reason why he did not raise the grounds raised 
in this latter application the first time.' (Emphasis added.) 
114 Idaho at 445, 757 P.2d at 708 . 
Id. 
. . . Moreover, insofar as the application was dismissed for failure to provide 
sufficient reason to show why the grounds alleged in that application were not 
raised in the first application, we uphold the district court's determination. 
Contrary to the State's argument, King does not support its position that in order to 
survive a motion for summary dismissal, a petitioner must verify his response to the District 
Court's notice of intent to dismiss or must present evidence besides his own statements within 
,.., 
_) 
his pleadings in conformance with I.R.C.P. I l(a) setting out his reasons for not raising his claims 
in the original petition. 
The State's argument that the lack of verification of the prose response to the notice of 
intent to dismiss is fatal to the establishment of sufficient reason for filing a successive petition is 
contrary to the post-conviction statutes, the Civil Rules, and the case law and should be rejected. 
2. The Case Must Be Remanded For A Determination Of 
Sufficient Reason 
In the District Court, the State did not controvert any of Mr. Kuehl' s statements as to why 
his claims were not raised in the initial post-conviction proceedings. See State's Motion for 
Summary Dismissal of Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, R. Vol. 1, pp. 146-7; 
State's Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal of Successive Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief, R. Vol. 1, pp. 148-60; State's Brief in Support of Motion for Summary 
Dismissal of Augmented Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, R. Vol. 3, pp. 574-90; 
State's Motion for Summary Dismissal of Augmented Successive Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief, R. Vol. 3, pp. 591-2; and the transcript of the 2/18/10 hearing on the Motion for Summary 
Dismissal. Rather, the State focused on arguing that Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591,635 P.2d 
955,957 (1981) and Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794,992 P.2d 789 (1999), are limited to their 
facts and are not generally applicable to post-conviction cases. R. Vol. 1, pp. 152-3; Vol. 4, pp. 
582-4. 
Palmer holds that allegations of ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel in 
omitting claims from an initial petition provide sufficient reason for permitting the newly 
asserted claims to be raised in a successive petition. 102 Idaho at 596, 635 P.2d at 960. 
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Hernandez affirms that Palmer remains the law and extends Palmer to hold that 
allegations that post-conviction counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately raise a claim in 
the initial post-conviction proceeding is also a sufficient reason for permitting a successive 
petition. 133 Idaho at 799, 992 P.2d at 794. 
On appeal, the State limits its argument against Palmer and Hernandez to one sentence in 
footnote 3 on page 11 of its brief. Instead of offering in depth argument about Palmer and 
Hernandez, the State raises two new arguments on appeal. The State now asserts for the first 
time on appeal: 1) that the reasons for the successive petition were not sufficient because Mr. 
Kuehl did not provide the District Court with a copy of the prison post-conviction guidelines 
packet, and 2) that the allegations that the newly asse1ied claims were not raised in the original 
petition because of the ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction and appellate counsel are 
not true. Respondent's Brief pages l 17. 
The State's briefs argument that Hernandez and Palmer do not apply to Mr. Kuehl's case 
is incorrect. Those cases remain the law and "[i]neffective assistance of prior post-conviction 
counsel may provide sufficient reason for pem1itting newly asserted allegations or allegations 
inadequately raised in the initial application to be raised in a subsequent post-conviction 
application." Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189, 177 P.3d 400,403 (Ct.App. 2008), citing 
Palmer and Hernandez. also, Baker v. State, 142 Idaho 411,412, 128 P.3d 948,947 (Ct. 
App. 2005); Grtffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 128 P.3d 978 (Ct.App. 2008). In accord with those 
cases, remand of this case is appropriate so that the District Comi may review the reasons offered 
for the filing of the second petition and make its findings. 
In its new argument about the guideline packet, the State does not controve1i Mr. Kuehl's 
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claim that the prison post-conviction guideline packet, while correct, was incomplete and that 
this incompleteness led him to fail to raise the issues in the second petition in the original 
petition. Instead, the State asserts that Mr. Kuehl has not supplied the Court with a copy of the 
packet or specifically explained how the guideline packet caused him to "waive" his successive 
claims. Respondent's Brief at pages 15-6. (The State uses the term "waive his successive 
claims." However, Mr. Kuehl is actually arguing the opposite of waiver - he is arguing that he 
did not raise the claims in the first petition, but that he did not waive them by this failure to raise 
them earlier.) 
The State is not asserting that the prison post-conviction packet was not the cause of the 
failure to raise the claims in the first petition. The State is only arguing that more proof is 
needed. Even accepting the State's argument, this is only an argument for an evidentiary hearing 
on the truth of Mr. Kuehl's statements about the post-conviction packet; it is not an argument for 
summary dismissal without consideration of the reasons for the filing of the second petition. 
The State more directly controverts Mr. Kuehl's statements that he failed to raise the 
claims presented in the second petition in the first petition because counsel in the original post-
conviction proceeding incorrectly told him that none of the claims could be raised in the original 
petition. The State argues that it is impossible that prior counsel's advice caused Mr. Kuehl to 
not raise the claims in the first petition because Mr. Kuehl did not speak with prior counsel until 
October 2003, a date after the time for filing an original petition had passed. Respondent's Brief 
at pages 16-17. 
However, the State's argument overlooks the fact that in October 2003, Mr. Kuehl's 
original petition was still pending before the District Court. See ROA CV-2003-00113 7 attached 
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as Appendix A to this brief. As the original petition could still have been amended to include 
Mr. Kuehl 's claims in October 2003, J.C. § l 9-4903(a), prior counsel's advice at that time could 
have caused the failure to include the claims of the second petition in the original petition. 
The third reason offered by Mr. Kuehl for not including the claims of the second petition 
in the original petition was that appellate counsel told him that he had to proceed by way of a 
successive petition. R. Vol. 1, pp. 129-30. The State responds to this argument by asserting that 
Mr. Kuehl should have known of the ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel when the 
remittitur in the direct appeal was entered on May 28, 2002. Respondent's Brief page 15, ftnt. 5. 
This response is off target. Mr. Kuehl is not offering appellate counsel's ineffectiveness in the 
direct appeal as a reason why the claims raised in the second petition were not raised earlier. He 
is stating that appellate counsel told him that he needed to raise his post-conviction claims in a 
successive, not the original, petition. This allegation is a sufficient reason for a successive 
petition. Hernandez, supra. 
While the State's belated attempts to controvert Mr. Kuehl's reasons for filing a 
successive petition can be rebutted, the salient fact for this Court is that the State is asking this 
Court to become the fact finder instead of the District Court. If the State wishes to controvert the 
reasons for the successive petition, remanding for a fact finding hearing is the appropriate means. 
Griffin v. State, supra (remand is the appropriate remedy when it cannot be discerned whether the 
Court erroneously overlooked the possibility that the petitioner had presented sufficient reason 
for a successive petition or whether the court had decided without explanation that there was not 
sufficient evidence to support the alleged reason for the successive petition). 
The District Court in this case did not make findings regarding whether Mr. Kuehl's 
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allegations of ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel and allegations regarding the 
incomplete information in the prison information packet were true. Rather, the Court entered an 
order which leaves Mr. Kuehl and this Court unable to discern whether the Court erroneously 
overlooked the possibility that ineffective assistance and the incomplete information in the prison 
packet could constitute sufficient reason under I.C. § 19-4908 for Mr. Kuehl to present the claims 
in the second petition or decided without explanation that there was not sufficient evidence of 
ineffective assistance of counsel or misinformation from the prison. In accord with Griffin, 
supra, the proper remedy is to remand so that the District Court may review Mr. Kuehl's 
allegations and make appropriate findings. 
B. The Petition Was Timely 
Mr. Kuehl has argued that his petition was timely filed based upon the relation-back rule 
of Hernandez, supra. He has argued that the District Court erred in reaching the opposite 
conclusion based upon its misconstruction of Hernandez. 
The State does not respond to this argument regarding the application of Hernandez, 
except in footnote 3 at pages 10-11 of its brief. And, there, in the footnote, the State simply cites 
Hernandez and without argument states that it does not apply to Mr. Kuehl. 
In the face of this lack of argument, Mr. Kuehl relies upon his Opening Brief to establish 
that Hernandez does apply to this case and that under Hernandez the petition is timely. 
C. The Rule 60(b) Motion Should Have Been Granted 
The argument as to why the Rule 60(b) motion should have been granted is set out in full 
in the Opening Brief at pages 16-19 and will not be reiterated here. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in the Opening Brief and above, the District Court erred in 
summarily dismissing Mr. Kuehl' s successive petition and in denying the Rule 60(b) motion. 
Mr. Kuehl therefore requests that the case be remanded for factual findings regarding whether 
Mr. Kuehl' s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and incomplete information from the 
prison are true and sufficient reasons for not raising his claims in his original petition and 
whether under these circumstances his petition was timely. 
Respectfully submitted this I Y ty of September, 2011. 
Deborah Whipple 
Attorney for Darryl Kuehl 
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